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Should there be Freedom of Dissociation? 
David S. Oderberg* 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary liberal societies are seeing increasing pressures on individuals to act against 
their consciences. Most of the pressure is directed at freedom of religion but it also affects 
ethical beliefs more generally, contrary to the recognition of freedom of religion and 
conscience as a basic human right. I propose the idea that freedom of dissociation, as a 
corollary of freedom of association, could be a practical and ethically acceptable solution to 
the conscience problem. I examine freedom of association and explain how freedom of 
dissociation follows from it, showing then how dissociation protects freedom of religion and 
conscience. Extreme cases, such as the problem of the Satanist nurse, can be handled within a 
dissociationist framework, so it is reasonable to think less extreme cases can also be dealt 
with. The serious objection that dissociationism entails unjust discrimination is answered, 
primarily by appeal to the need for ‘full and fair access’ to goods and services by all groups. I 
then allay important concerns about what kind of liberal society we should want to live in. 
Next, I refute the charge that a dissociationist society violates liberalism’s ‘higher good’, 
arguing that liberalism strictly does not have a higher good. I conclude with some reflections 
on what a dissociationist society might look like. 
 
Keywords: freedom of association; freedom of conscience; religious freedom; conscientious 
objection 
 
1. Introduction: the problem of conscience in contemporary liberal society 
I begin with some recent news stories to illustrate the theme of this paper: 
1) Health insurers in California required by the state to provide health cover for 
abortion (not just contraception) even if the employer is a church.1 
2) The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario now requires all Ontario doctors 
to refer requesters of euthanasia if the doctor objects.2 
3) Catholic care home in Belgium fined for refusing euthanasia.3 
 
Two of these cases concern Christians and Christian organisations. All of them concern 
health care. For an illustration not involving Christians, consider: 
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4) In a recent survey of medical students, 36% of Muslims said they would object to 
performing an intimate examination of a patient of the opposite sex.4 The General 
Medical Council’s Education Committee, however, said in 2006 that ‘it would not be 
possible for a doctor to practise in that environment while refusing to examine, for 
example, half of all patients on grounds of gender’.5 
For an illustration not involving health care, there is this: 
5) In 2007, the University of Delaware was forced by adverse publicity to drop a 
‘treatment’ programme in residence halls for the ideological manipulation of students. 
Students were required to meet with advisers to answer questions such as ‘when did 
you discover your sexual identity?’, questions about their views on environmentalism, 
diversity, racism, and whether they were ‘privileged’ or ‘oppressed’.6 When one 
student was asked about their sexuality, they replied ‘none of your damn business’, as 
one might expect. 
What these and countless other cases have in common is that they involve people being 
compelled by law, or by regulations of some kind, or by general expectation, to act in a way 
contrary to their sincerely-held religious and/or ethical beliefs. Health care is clearly a 
lightning rod for this kind of problem, but it can be found across society from solemn legal 
environments to everyday situations. As far as health care is concerned, a recent ‘consensus 
statement’ has been proclaimed by fifteen bioethicists and philosophers, in which they insist, 
among other things, that: (i) medical practitioners should normally allow their professional 
obligations to override their consciences; (ii) they must, if they refuse to carry out a particular 
treatment, refer the patient to someone who will, or if this is impossible they must do it 
themselves; (iii) tribunals should be established to assess the sincerity and reasonableness of 
a practitioner’s conscientious objection; (iv) the burden should be on the practitioner to prove 
that their objection is sincere and reasonable; (v) practitioners who receive an exemption on 
grounds of conscience should compensate society by doing some other work of public 
benefit; (vi) students should be trained in performing ‘basic medical procedures’ even if they 
believe them morally wrong; and (vii) practitioners should be ‘educated’ about their 
professional obligations and the possibility of ‘cognitive bias’ in their conscientious 
objection.7 
Clearly there are rumblings of concern within health care about the problems caused 
by people of differing religious and ethical outlooks working in the same environment and all 
aiming at providing the same overall kind of service. The problem is only magnified outside 
health care, even in a multitude of relatively quotidian ways, whether it be an objection to 
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having to use a ‘gender-neutral’ bathroom, sunning oneself on the beach next to Moslem 
women in burkas, compulsory sex education in schools, and so on. The choice of illustration 
is not relevant to the present discussion, even though individual examples are interesting and 
worth discussing. Nor, to be frank, are the merits of any particular case relevant to present 
purposes. My focus is on the increasing conflict between significantly different viewpoints in 
a liberal, pluralistic, and largely secular society. The conflict might be between different 
religious outlooks or between a secular and a religious outlook, and involve variations within 
those overarching perspectives. 
Note at once that by ‘liberal’ I do not mean something as specific as classical 
liberalism to the exclusion of social liberalism, or vice versa. Although the social liberalism 
of contemporary society is what will most readily come to mind throughout the present 
discussion, I do not see as great a difference between it and classical liberalism as others 
might. Both kinds of liberalism privilege the secular, pluralistic state and aim at harmony in 
diversity. Whereas the classical liberal expects the aim to be realised voluntarily, the social 
liberal is not afraid to enlist government to enforce the harmony. With social liberalism now 
dominant, and given its emphasis on the role of the state, the threat to freedom of religion and 
of conscience clearly comes from that direction rather than from classical liberalism. 
At the moment, the way Western societies (my sole concern) deal with conflicts 
between various ethical outlooks, whether religious or secular, is in a piecemeal fashion, on a 
case-by-case basis. The courts, mainly in the USA, are loaded with litigation either 
challenging some law requiring a person or group to, as they see it, violate their 
religious/ethical beliefs, or attempting to overturn a refusal by some person or group to act in 
this way. Whether it’s wearing a cross at one’s place of work,8 wearing a Burkini on the 
beach,9 or baking a cake for a gay wedding,10 governments and courts try to handle the 
situation in a way that does not set an overall precedent for these types of conscientious 
objection case. 
This is not a stable solution. Maybe there is no stable solution, but some solutions 
might be more stable than others. Moreover, it is not merely a question of stability but of 
morality. Can any overarching principle be proposed to justify a general approach to these 
cases? Well, there is the principle of compulsion: conscientious objection should have no 
recognition, and any person (or group) may be compelled by the law to violate their 
conscience for a good reason. The authors of the ‘consensus statement’ on conscientious 
objection seem to have a slightly milder form of that position as regards health care, the rider 
being that good reasons are those involving currently legal treatment that is in the best 
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interests of the patient. By this reasoning apotemnophilia, a person’s persistent desire for the 
amputation of a healthy limb, if the amputation were to remove that desire and spare the 
person mental distress, might well be required ‘treatment’ even if it violated the consciences 
of most doctors, religious or not. That aside, the principle of compulsion leaves the crucial 
question untouched: what counts as a good reason? A religious person might well sign up to 
the principle that conscience can be overridden. But they would differ markedly from a 
secularist about the conditions under which that can be done. Abortion is a classic example; 
wearing a Burkini on the beach a relatively newer one. So the principle of compulsion would 
bring us back to square one. 
Moreover, isn’t compulsion supposed to be a last resort in a liberal society? Isn’t 
freedom of religion a fundamental right in such a society? At the very least, should it not 
entail that religious people cannot be compelled to act in violation of their deeply-held 
religious beliefs, at least the ones that are central to their religious outlook? Religious 
freedom has had the occasional notable success recently, perhaps the most famous being the 
landmark US Supreme Court case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which a for-profit 
corporation was exempted from providing employee contraceptive cover as part of its 
Obamacare-mandated employer health insurance plan. The ground was that the company 
owners complained the mandate violated their sincerely-held religious beliefs, and the court 
agreed.11 In that case, however, the plaintiffs could rely on the strongly-worded Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act 1993,12 and yet even that legislation is hedged in many American 
states by ‘non-discrimination’ clauses or supplementary statues containing, for instance, 
‘LGBT’ anti-discrimination provisions.13 
It is fair to say, as a matter of fact, that it is religious believers who are very much on 
the back foot in the current state of things, and increasingly so.14 I cannot think of a single 
case where, in one of the modern, liberal, democratic, secular, pluralistic societies a secular 
person – one who is non-religious or who, even if privately religious, does not take religious 
principle to be a guide to how they should act publicly or in relations with other people – has 
found themselves under legal pressure to conform to a religious norm. By the definition of 
the kind of societies we are talking about, this is going to be rare. On the other hand, you will 
find a small minority of cases where secular people have objected, in conscience, to the legal 
pressure of secular norms – the most well known being conscientious objection in wartime, 
but there is also compulsory sex education in schools, to which even many secular people 
object. Still, if you look at the history of litigation in this area, it nearly always involves 
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religious individuals or organisations objecting to laws that compel them to act against their 
beliefs. 
Whatever the ultimate, objective solution to these problems, I question whether, in a 
society of the kind that is my concern, there can be any solution short of the one I am going 
to consider. Secular compulsion – a general governmental right to override conscience – is 
incompatible with a liberal society, as liberalism is commonly understood. So is blanket 
protection for conscience as an inviolable right. A piecemeal approach seems to me both 
unprincipled and to postpone the problem rather than resolving it. But there might be another 
way: although it would be consistent with the main characteristics of a liberal society it 
would not exactly live up to its ideals; but then I’m not sure its ideals – or perhaps its 
ambitions – were ever acceptable to large portions of the citizenry of most liberal states. Even 
for more pragmatic liberals the solution might fall short of expectations, but it is a question of 
weighing alternatives and it may be that, if a solution consistent with liberalism is available 
and has the least cost, it is the one behind which liberals should rally whether they like it or 
not. 
 
2. Freedom of association entails freedom of dissociation 
I propose, then, not to start from freedom of religion, or freedom of conscience, but 
from freedom of association. Freedom of association is another one of the rights always 
officially recognised in liberal societies. The UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
puts it as follows:15 ‘(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association; (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association’. The European 
Convention on Human Rights says:16 ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others…’, followed by a specific reference to 
trades unions and the listing of many exceptions based on law, public safety, national 
security, and so on – to the point of making the right seem not very contentful.17 That aside 
for now, the wording of such statements seems narrow – confined explicitly or implicitly to 
trades unions, political organisations, and other semi-public bodies. But the right surely is not 
that narrow, whatever we think of the way it is worded in conventions and declarations.  
The right to free association includes such things as (and some of these are also 
recognised in international documents): the right to found a family and choose your spouse; 
the right to choose your friends; the right to choose where you live, with whom you socialise, 
who you let onto your property, where you shop, where you enjoy leisure time, your business 
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relationships, political associations – and more. Clearly freedom of association is a broad 
right whatever limitations it may be subject to. Note that freedom to choose where and with 
whom you do business is reflected in the legal right to freedom of contract, but this specific 
right is founded on the moral right to freedom of association. The same for the freedom to 
choose whom to let on your land, where the right to property presupposes freedom of 
association.18 Without freedom of association, or – more realistically – with severe 
curtailment of the right, totalitarianism is a likely consequence. One of the hallmarks of a 
totalitarian regime is its coercion of membership in officially-approved organisations only 
and expulsion from the rest. Another is its virtually total surveillance, which severely 
constricts a person’s choice of friends, associates, and even family. Totalitarianism contains 
the denial of freedom of association at its core. 
So I think we can all agree that freedom of association is a fundamental right, albeit 
not without limits. I am not free to associate with others for a criminal purpose: that’s 
conspiracy. I am not free, as the law currently stands, to marry five women at the same time, 
even if they all freely consent. Associations that break the law are forbidden, and of course 
the devil is always in the detail: what should those limits be? I want to focus, however, on the 
converse of freedom of association – what I call freedom of dissociation. After all, if we are 
free to associate with whomever we choose, why are we not free to dissociate from 
whomever we choose? Just as I am free to choose my friends, so I am free to drop them; just 
as I am free to join a trade union, a political party, or a gym, so I am free to end my 
membership. Nor am I required to join in the first place. So by dissociation I mean both non-
association and withdrawal from association. People are free to marry or remain single, and 
they are also free under law to separate or divorce. Some religions forbid divorce, and one 
may debate the ethics of divorce, but that’s not the point; we have already noted that issues 
arise over where limitations are to be drawn, and I will come to that. For now, I am arguing 
that there is a moral right to freedom of dissociation, and noting that the law reflects this. 
Now a brief aside of the kind typical among philosophers: one might question 
whether there is a general right to freedom of dissociation even though there is a general right 
to freedom of association. Perhaps there are specific rights to dissociate from certain kinds of 
relationship but no more. Why think that every right has, to use the technical parlance, a 
contrary? Does the right to educate one’s children imply a contrary right not to educate 
them? The right to keep a promise hardly entails a right to break it. Obviously, where a right 
entails or is entailed by an obligation to act in some way, there will not be a contrary right. 
That notwithstanding, most if not all of the rights we find clustered together with freedom of 
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association seem to have contraries. It is plausible to hold that every right that has the form of 
a permission, but without a corresponding obligation, has a contrary. Working out what the 
contrary of a right is can be tricky, but consider freedom of speech. I have the right to speak 
but also a contrary right. Which one? The contrary right is either ceasing to speak (obviously 
a right) or not speaking when one can, that is, deliberately remaining silent. Deliberate 
silence, again, has limitations (is there a right to be silent after witnessing some horrific 
crime?), but it looks pretty general. Isn’t the famous ‘right to silence’ of the common law part 
of that general right to be silent when one might speak? How about freedom of religion itself? 
I am free to belong to a religion but also free to end my membership, whatever the 
consequences may be for me personally. I am also free to be an atheist – deliberately to 
espouse no religion. Freedom of movement means I have the right to live wherever I want 
within my country, but I am also free not to move even if the opportunity arises to move; and 
I am free to settle once I have made my choice.  
It would be absurd to hold, though, that freedom of speech entails freedom to silence 
someone else, so that is obviously not a contrary right since the contrary of speaking is 
remaining silent, not silencing. The contrary of moving is staying still, not making someone 
else move. And so on. In other words, the contrary rights pertain to a person’s not doing what 
they have a right to do in a way that does not violate the rights of others. This is rights theory 
101, of course, but it is important for what I am going to argue. There may be rights with no 
contrary, only a contradictory. That is, although every (purely permissive) right to X entails a 
right not to X, it may be that not every right to X entails, to put it loosely, a right to un-X, or 
dis-X, or de-X, and so on for all the other verbal prefixes apart from ‘non’. I am not sure what 
rights they may be, which is why I assume for now that there are no Hotel California rights, 
as we might call them – rights you can exercise but not withdraw from exercising. Even if my 
assumption were false, though, it seems clear that the rights clustering together with freedom 
of association all do have contraries, which means the onus should be on my opponent to 
show why freedom of association is an exception. 
 
3. Freedom of dissociation as a solution to the conscience problem 
So let us accept, then, that there is a right to freedom of dissociation. What consequences 
might this have? My central claim is that invoking freedom of dissociation and putting it into 
practice is probably the best way of handling the conscientious objection problem growing 
ever greater in liberal, pluralistic, multicultural, secular democratic societies. It might be a 
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way of solving the problem rather than either managing it or overturning liberalism altogether 
and replacing it with a kind of secular authoritarianism. (This is a real possibility; religious 
authoritarianism is not, of course.) Before outlining what I think dissociationism means in 
principle and practice, I want to make clear what it is not. Dissociationism is not internal 
secession or balkanisation. That is, it does not mean the breaking up of liberal society into 
distinct, independently governed societies. Balkanisation can work (to the extent that any 
solution works for longer than decades): look at the Balkans after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
It usually is a recipe for instability, though, often leading to war or at least perpetual unrest. 
Dissociationism is not some sort of geopolitical strategy applied to one state, is not about who 
governs us, or about independence, ethnic preservation, and the like. Rather, it is about how 
people and groups interact with each other within a state. 
Note at once that freedom of dissociation can work at the group or individual level, 
unlike balkanisation. At the individual level, a person whose deeply-held religious or ethical 
convictions are violated by their having to do X in respect of some other person Y, should not 
be compelled to do X – not merely because of freedom of conscience, but because of freedom 
of dissociation. This is not playing with words, as though the two rights amounted to the 
same thing. Freedom of dissociation is clearly wider than freedom of conscience. If I choose 
not to be friends with you it is unlikely to be because it would violate my deeply-held 
religious or ethical beliefs. Our choices about who to do business with or who to choose as a 
spouse, or whether to get married or do any particular bit of business at all, are unlikely to be 
matters of conscience, nor is whether to join the local tennis club. Now, within the scope of 
freedom of association there will lie matters of conscience. Not all matters of conscience are 
matters of association, but many of them do fall within the broader ambit. So my question is: 
why shouldn’t individuals or groups be allowed, as a matter of law and policy, to dissociate 
themselves from relations with others when such relations would violate their conscience? 
And the follow-up question is: if they should be allowed, then as long as the people or groups 
from whom the former dissociate are still able to obtain what they want, why should they 
object to such a freedom – one they too would possess? 
Let’s start with health care, where so much of the concern currently exists. In the 
UK, there is a virtual government monopoly on health care (something that seems odd on its 
face, for why isn’t there a government monopoly on food provision, which is even more 
important than health?). In the UK, abortion has been legal since 1967. If you want to work in 
health care, at least in a clinical setting, and you are opposed to abortion, you are going to 
have a problem. There is a conscience clause in s.4 of the Abortion Act that will exempt you 
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from ‘participating in any treatment’ authorised by the Act, but as the midwives Doogan and 
Wood found out when they lost their Supreme Court case in 2014,19 the protection does not 
extend beyond the abortion procedure itself to related tasks such as supervising staff involved 
more directly in abortions and providing pre- and post-treatment care to patients seeking 
abortions. Given the wording of the Act, the Court reached a reasonable decision that what 
the plaintiffs objected to on conscience grounds was not covered by the exemption. 
Suppose, however, there were a more expansive provision of private health care 
alongside government provision, sufficient to give conscientious objectors to abortion or 
some other procedure a realistic choice about whether to expose themselves to activities to 
which they object. At the same time, those with no objection to the relevant activities would 
still have a practicable option to work within the government health care sector. Abortion, or 
whatever activity it may be, would remain legal and freely available, but objectors would be 
free and legally permitted to avoid it altogether. Why, at least in principle, should such an 
arrangement be objectionable? There would be no need for piecemeal conscience clauses or 
ad hoc litigation, though of course cases would still need adjudication and a body of common 
law precedent would need to develop. The situation would be in many respects similar to the 
USA, where the federal Church Amendments20 give extensive conscience protection to 
workers in hospitals in receipt of federal funding. Because there is a far more expansive 
private health sector in the USA than in the UK, there is already far more employment choice 
and health care workers can generally avoid getting into difficult conscience situations. 
 
4. The problem of the Satanist nurse 
As a solution to conscience problems in health care, more private sector choice would seem 
very promising. We should, though, look immediately at probably the hardest kind of case, 
one that is obviously bizarre although not beyond the realms of possibility. Take the case of 
the Satanist nurse who refuses to treat Christians because it goes against her Satanist code of 
conduct. Should her conscientious objection be respected in law and policy? There are three 
reasons why the nurse might find herself in that situation: it was deliberate; it was an 
accident; it was necessary. If deliberate, that is, the nurse wanted to be in a situation where 
she could refuse to administer live-saving treatment to a Christian, she would be no different 
to the diabolical serial killer nurses we occasionally hear about21 – liable to prosecution for 
homicide. I do not suggest that current laws regarding crimes against the person should be 
changed to accommodate conscientious objection to not killing! On the other hand, if the 
WARNING – AUTHOR COPY ONLY. NOT OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. NOT FOR CITATION. 
OFFICIAL VERSION IS PUBLISHED IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  37 (2017): 167-181 
 10 
Satanist nurse was there by accident, she obviously did not know what she might be exposed 
to, so she lacked information. The remedy would be for every hospital to make it abundantly 
clear what kinds of treatment they provided and whether their patient base was universal or 
restricted. 
The third reason is that the nurse had nowhere else to work and, knowing the 
problem she might face of having to treat a Christian, held her nose and went to work there 
anyway. The solution is obvious: she shouldn’t have to work there! On my proposal, she 
should not have to find another profession any more than Doogan and Wood. Rather, she 
would have the option of working in a private Satanist hospital where the Satanist code of 
conduct would be a precondition of employment and the hospital advertised quite clearly and 
unambiguously who they treated and what services they offered. Needless to say, the hospital 
should not expect a large clientele – many hard-headed Satanists would probably avoid it as 
well – but at least the nurse would have somewhere to ply her Satanic trade. But I said that 
dissociationism should apply to individuals as well as groups: what if the nurse was, as it 
were, ‘the only Satanist in the village’? That freedom of dissociation applies to individuals as 
well as groups does not imply that an individual can manage without a group to back them 
up. Conscientious objectors in wartime generally benefit from well worked-out procedures 
enabling them to avoid violating their consciences, whether they be moved to medical work, 
administrative jobs, and so on. An individual pacifist may well feel himself alone but he 
knows that there will be others scattered about and many that have gone before him, and he 
can benefit from that shared history. By contrast, if there really were only one Satanist health 
care worker with no Satanist support to rely on it would, alas, be bad luck: if the person in 
that society is so idiosyncratic in their beliefs as to find themselves out on a limb, they might 
just have to make some sacrifices, so to speak. They might well have to retrain, or else leave 
the country. A small price to pay, I should think, for a blanket right to dissociation. 
 
5. The unjust discrimination worry: forced labour versus full and fair access 
In discussing this sort of outlier case I am not trying to be facetious or dismissive. On the 
contrary, if such an outlier can be handled, more realistic and less bizarre cases probably can 
as well. In 2013, the UK Supreme Court dismissed a final appeal by Mr and Mrs Bull, 
owners, of a guest house in Cornwall, against Mr Preddy and Mr Hall, a gay couple who had 
sought to rent a double room from the owners.22 They were refused since the owners, as 
Christians, disapproved of homosexuality – in fact of all extra-marital sexual relations. 
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Preddy and Hall claimed discrimination under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2007, and were successful. Once again, given the law as it stands, it is hard to 
see how a different decision could have been reached. As Lady Hale, writing for the Court, 
put it: ‘Now that, at long last, same sex couples can enter into a mutual commitment which is 
the equivalent of marriage, the suppliers of goods, facilities and services should treat them in 
the same way.’23  
It seems to me that this sort of case raises very serious, wide-ranging problems of 
what might called a structural nature, having nothing in particular to do with gay rights or 
Christians. The UK Supreme Court ruled that a Christian who objects to homosexuality must 
rent their guest house room to a gay couple. Renting means selling a time-limited portion of 
one’s property. In the case of a guest house, it also means selling whatever services come 
with rental of a room, such as making meals, cleaning the room, providing various amenities, 
and so on. So if the law requires a person to sell their goods and services to another person, 
even though they object on conscientious grounds to doing so, why shouldn’t the law also 
require a person to work for another person even though they object, on conscientious 
grounds, to working for that person? After all, working for someone is just another contract 
of sale – the sale of one’s labour. Moreover, if the law, as it does, requires a person to hire 
another even though they object, on conscientious grounds, to doing so, why shouldn’t it 
require someone to work for another despite conscientious objection? In other words, if you 
are compelled to sell your goods and services to someone despite conscientious objection, 
why not your labour? And if you are compelled to buy someone’s labour despite such an 
objection, why shouldn’t you be compelled to sell it? Yet being compelled by law to work for 
someone you don’t want to work for is tantamount to a form of slavery, or at least forced 
labour. 
For what it is worth, forced labour has long been condemned by the International 
Labour Organisation, in conventions dating back to 1930 and 1957.24 The 1930 convention, 
ratified to date by 178 countries (i.e., virtually universally), condemns ‘all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily.’25 The only exceptions are military service, 
‘normal civic obligations’ including ‘minor communal services’, punishment for conviction 
in a court, and emergency service. Under ‘normal civic obligations’ one might include such 
paid or unpaid labour as jury service and assisting law enforcement, among others.26 There is 
no suggestion that it includes routine employment. Further, the 1957 convention, ratified by 
175 countries, explicitly condemns ‘forced or compulsory labour’ as ‘a means of political 
WARNING – AUTHOR COPY ONLY. NOT OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. NOT FOR CITATION. 
OFFICIAL VERSION IS PUBLISHED IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  37 (2017): 167-181 
 12 
coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views 
ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system’, and as ‘as a 
means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.’27 On the face of it, it seems that 
being compelled to sell one’s labour to a specific person or group despite a conscientious 
objection to doing so is ruled out under these conventions. Yet if one must sell ones goods 
and services, what is the difference? 
If freedom of dissociation were given the force that it deserves, many of these sorts 
of problem could be obviated. A Christian couple could refuse to rent their room to a gay 
couple as long as there were other providers willing to supply a room. Why should it matter 
that there be other providers? In other words, why should freedom of dissociation depend 
upon whether one of the parties can have their wants fulfilled by a third party? The answer is 
that I am trying to find a practicable solution to the problem that respects both sides. Suppose 
Bill and Bob are starving and they come across one life-saving piece of food that, if divided 
between them, would not be enough to save either of them. Who should get the food, 
assuming there are no other factors to differentiate them in terms of entitlement? It looks as 
though, in a case such as this, morality has no answer. But it does, and the answer is – toss a 
coin. After all, to say that neither Bill nor Bob should have the food, and so both should die, 
seems morally repugnant. To say that both should have the food is morally impossible since it 
is physically impossible. To say that one should be preferred over the other, given no 
differentiating factor, seems objectionably arbitrary because ungrounded in any good reason. 
A coin toss looks like the only decent alternative: if Bob wins the toss, then his getting the 
food is not objectionably arbitrary. This is because the coin toss is a way of recognising 
rather than denying the equal entitlement of both individuals. Random selection is precisely 
the reason for awarding the food to one rather than the other. 
Return now to the case at hand. Suppose we were in the unlikely situation where the 
gay couple could not find another guest house that was sufficiently suitable to meet their 
needs, and there was no other compromise they could reasonably be asked to make (such as 
abiding by the rules of the Christian guest house or not taking a holiday in that area, or at that 
time, and so on). In that case, given the assumption that both sides had an equal entitlement to 
have their rights respected (an assumption I have been making all along), a coin toss looks 
like the only solution. If the Christian owners win, the gay couple doesn’t get the room. If the 
gay couple wins, they do. We cannot say that freedom of dissociation should prevail because 
that would make one side a winner and the other a loser despite their equal entitlement. 
Hence the requirement that the gay couple should have a reasonable prospect of meeting their 
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requirements in another way. Of course, what counts as a ‘reasonable prospect’ is going to be 
difficult to unpack. Minor inconvenience doesn’t make a prospect unreasonable. Having to 
make a total change of plan does. Perhaps the devil is in the detail, but here I tend to think the 
details should not detain us at this stage. The main point is that if dissociationism is to be a 
viable policy, all parties have to have a reasonable prospect of respect for their rights. In a 
conscience case, the objector must have a reasonable prospect of their conscientious 
objection being respected, and the opposing party must have a similar prospect of their rights 
being respected. 
Now consider a particularly difficult case. Take the owner of a guest house who 
refuses to rent a room to someone because of their ethnicity, or their religion, or gender. 
Should freedom of dissociation have any sway here at all? Many of us would think not, just 
as many would object to dissociation in the Christian guest house/gay couple case. In the 
latter case, however, dissociation does not seem repugnant on its face. In contemporary 
liberal society, in fact, dissociation might lead to a thriving market in guest houses for gay 
couples (only gay and also mixed), and perhaps also in guest houses for Christians. There’s 
no reason in advance for thinking that either group would not be catered for to a good 
standard. Yet when it comes to ethnicity, religion, or gender (and perhaps other groupings) 
we tend to think immediately that old prejudices will rear their head and one group or other 
will end up with the short end of the straw. We think of certain groups being treated as 
‘second-class citizens’ with access only to second-tier facilities. This is not inevitable, mind 
you: male-only clubs are still legal in the UK but there has been a surge in female-only clubs 
in classy parts of London. It is still legal in the UK to refuse membership to a club or 
association on grounds of, among other characteristics, religion or ethnic origin, as long as 
the club is set up precisely for the purpose of restriction to the characteristic on the basis of 
which refusal of membership is made.28 So it is not as though it is inexorable that lower-
grade facilities would be all that became available to persons or groups refused admission to 
decent facilities. Even if this was the result, why couldn’t the government step in and 
mandate certain standards for all associations? They already do it for food retail, doctors’ 
surgeries, and so on. 
 
6. What kind of society? 
Such reassurances notwithstanding, perhaps the heart of the worry has not yet been 
addressed. Maybe it is not about second-class standards but about the kind of society we want 
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to live in, about attitudes toward each other. If there were wholesale limitations on 
association available to any and every group and even every individual, what would this say 
about our common citizenry and about the ‘inclusiveness’ that is supposed to be the hallmark 
of a liberal, diverse, secular, tolerant, pluralistic society? I see the worry, but I also see how 
the issue of tolerance and respect cuts both ways. On one hand, we show tolerance and 
respect by encouraging association among fellow citizens rather than discouraging it. The 
governments of pluralistic societies, as well as many liberal-minded citizens, want people to 
be happy together, not apart. The desire is hardly unreasonable, and it would certainly be 
illiberal to encourage dissociation among people who do not want it. In other words, 
dissociationism should not trump free association; rather, it is merely the converse of an 
existing right, and if the former is downgraded the latter ceases to be a mere right (if, as I 
claim, it is) and becomes something akin to an obligation. This looks like a recipe for friction 
rather than a social lubricant. 
On the other hand, an essential element of tolerance and respect is the recognition 
that we all have certain freedoms in the way we organize our space of social interactions. A 
person or group might not wish to form a certain association because of a deep and sincerely-
held objection to involvement in an organization that requires performance of certain actions 
violating their religious or ethical beliefs. Or, at the other end of the spectrum, they might 
simply not want to form a certain association due to personal or group preference. People do 
this sort of thing all the time, for example in the choice of where they live, where they work, 
or where they send their children to school. Now a given preference may or may not mask an 
attitude worthy of deprecation. I might not want to be your friend or, less strongly, not seek 
your friendship because I haven’t noticed you, or have enough friends already. Such 
situations hardly involve reprehensible attitudes. It might also be that I suspect you are not 
loyal, are untrustworthy, or just plain boring. Here, attitudes are in play but they may be 
perfectly reasonable, founded on good evidence. They may also involve honest beliefs 
founded on insufficient evidence yet without any cognitive irresponsibility on my part. Now 
suppose I don’t like the colour of your hair, or don’t want to be seen with you because I find 
you ugly, or I just don’t like the colour of your skin. Probably all of us would see such 
attitudes as worthy of disapproval and yet no law forces us to make friends with anyone, 
however bad our reasons for not doing so. It is hard, more importantly undesirable, to 
legislate against bad attitudes per se, and downright totalitarian to compel particular 
friendships whatever the reasons people have for not forming them. 
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It is not clear to me why civic friendship, if I can put it that way, is especially 
different in this regard. We all have civic duties, of course, both to the state and to each other, 
and these require a certain amount of association. I have to associate with Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs to the extent necessary for me to pay my taxes. Absolutist tax 
protesters aside, we rightly find this sort of compelled association desirable. Whenever 
someone takes on a certain social role, or enters into certain communal activities having 
understood and tacitly accepted the rules surrounding those activities, they are to a degree 
compelled to associate with particular persons and groups rather than others. If you choose to 
shop in Sainsbury’s, you had better accept the need to associate minimally with the other 
shoppers. If you choose to send your child to school X rather than school Y, you had better be 
ready to associate, perhaps to a relatively high degree, with the other parents as well as the 
teachers. Now this idea of tacit acceptance is important, and it clearly undergirds many of our 
social interactions. The critic of dissociationism might object that civic friendship is 
disanalogous to personal friendship precisely due to this tacit acceptance. One does not have 
to be a contractarian about morality to recognize that there is a sense in which we have all 
‘signed up’ to certain kinds of behaviour merely by dint of being a citizen of a certain state, 
whether or not we chose to be one. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, what have we signed up to in virtue 
merely of being citizens rather than citizens who have adopted certain roles or social 
environments? We have signed up to kinds of association necessary for the fulfilment of our 
civic duties, whether it be paying taxes, being good neighbours, obeying the law, keeping the 
peace, and so on. If we are capable of working and have no prior duty not to, we have signed 
up to being productive members of society. We have not, I contend, signed up to associating 
with any particular individual or group, though we have signed up to being, as it were, ‘good 
associates’ of both those with whom association is unavoidable in the circumstances and of 
whomever we have chosen to associate with in the first place. Other than that, I contend, we 
are – to put it in a slightly negative form – free to be left alone. I am not averse to calling the 
freedom of dissociation the ‘right to be left alone’ because this formulation wears on its face 
the notion of personal space – the freedom without which a person truly is a cog in a 
totalitarian regime. Personal space is not undermined by the simple fact that when you do 
associate with other citizens, whether through choice or necessity, you are obliged to be civil 
to them – in the literal, etymological sense of the term. Only anarchists or sociopaths think 
that one’s very presence in a state, living with its citizenry, is an affront to one’s personal 
space. That space is undermined, in my view, by state-sanctioned requirements of particular 
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association. Such requirements shrink one’s personal space almost to vanishing point if 
applied across the board. If not applied across the board yet still applied broadly in a way that 
rubs increasingly against one’s deeply-held beliefs or even against one’s simple personal and 
day-to-day choices – as is the case now – one’s personal space is severely constrained and 
diminished. 
 
7. Does liberal society have a higher good? 
Yet isn’t the dissociationist still missing the point? Isn’t it just ‘for the good of society’ that 
the state can compel certain kinds of association from which people might otherwise resile? 
But exactly what does the good of society consist in? Isn’t that part of what the disagreement 
is all about, in particular whether it is for the good of society that there be a legally-
recognized right to dissociation, one that has both passive and active components? The 
passive component is the right to be left alone ab initio. The active component is the right to 
withdraw from associations imposed upon a person or group that do not come under the 
umbrella of the general civic duties, and similar ones, mentioned earlier. Now if the ‘good of 
society’ is just what is being contested, then appeal to it by either side has no weight. To 
make the point more clearly, consider an illustration. Take, for example, sixteenth-century 
Florence or seventeenth-century England. Consider the state-imposed compulsory 
contribution for maintenance of the church – the Catholic Church in Florence, or the Church 
of England. More specifically, consider the obligation of a person residing within a certain 
parish to contribute to the building of a new parish church. There are four relevant situations 
to consider. (1) The citizen accepts that there is a higher obligation, overriding their personal 
choice about whether to contribute – namely, the transcendent good of the Church. And there 
does exist such a good, as an objective fact. (2) The citizen does not accept that there is a 
higher obligation, but in fact there is a transcendent good grounding such an obligation. (3) 
The citizen accepts a higher obligation, but no such transcendent good exists. (4) The citizen 
does not accept a higher obligation, and no such transcendent good exists. 
Now, in case (1) the citizen has no right to decline to pay, nor would they even 
consider not paying. In case (2), they have no right to decline to pay, so if they did decline 
due to non-recognition of a higher good, the most they could be afforded by the state is a 
degree of tolerance in the strict sense. That is, for the greater peace and stability of society, 
the state might tolerate their non-payment, or a derisory payment. In case (3), we are 
assuming that there is no higher good: the society, be it Florence or England, is founded on a 
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big mistake. Yet the citizen frankly accepts a higher obligation, however ill founded. In other 
words, they have signed up to certain civic duties recognised in that society. Objectively, they 
may be under no unqualified obligation to help pay for a new church; nor may any other 
citizen. However, to put it glibly, they have to play by the rules. Less glibly, the citizen is 
under an objective but qualified obligation to abide by the conventions of that society if for 
no other reason than the sake of peace and stability. What of case (4), where the citizen does 
not accept the requirement to pay and there is no higher good justifying the supposed 
obligation? Here it is hard to see how anything could override a right by the citizen to 
dissociate from the relationships requiring payment. There might be grounds involving peace 
and stability, but only if the objecting citizens were to suffer some sort of marginalization or 
‘ghettoisation’ that denied them fair and equal access to the civic amenities they wished to 
enjoy. That is precisely why fair and equal access, practically speaking, is so important. What 
about, from the other side, the difficulty the church might find itself in of not benefitting from 
contributions that are being withheld? That too might cause instability among the citizens 
who fully accept an obligation to pay. Yet I do not see how that sort of risk in any way 
morally obliges the objectors. If you give me some spurious reason why you need my 
property, and I know the reason is baseless, the friction caused by your not getting your way 
hardly obliges me to cough up, as it were. 
In cases (1) to (3), there is no clear right to dissociation, at least – in case (3) – not 
one any citizen would seek to exercise. I submit that our current predicament is akin to case 
(4). Objectors to certain forms of association – in particular, conscientious objectors – do not 
recognise an obligation to associate in those ways. The slight but interesting difference from 
(4) is that with respect to (4) I suggested the state might be labouring under an illusion about 
whether a transcendent good underwrites the obligations they seek to impose on recalcitrant 
citizens. Perhaps the religion to which the rulers appeal is a mistake. In our case, however – 
the case of liberal society – it’s not that liberalism might be wrong (a whole other discussion) 
but that liberalism itself offers no higher good to underwrite the obligations of association it 
seeks to impose. In other words, what exactly is it that liberalism can appeal to that, if it 
existed, would underwrite a wholly general obligation to associate in ways the state deemed 
desirable? Is it ‘progress’? But appeal to progress is either vacuous or question begging in 
this context. What progress could it be other than the progress that involves citizens 
associating in the way the state wants? The same applies to a term such as ‘harmony’. What 
about ‘getting along’? Again, the risk of begging the question is front and centre. There are 
various ways of getting along, and one of them might be by not getting along – going one’s 
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separate way to a large extent. The same goes for ‘peace’ – the peace of separation can be as 
effective as the peace of togetherness, and sometimes the peace of the latter is as illusory as 
the peace of the former is enticing. By ‘peace’ one might mean ‘peace and stability’, the 
absence of conflict. In that sense, there might of course be an overriding reason to prevent 
dissociation, but that, to repeat, is precisely why fair and equal access is essential to 
preventing the sort of conflict that an appeal to peace and stability is designed to avert. 
 
8. Conclusion: the look of a dissociationist society 
What does all of this fairly abstract theorizing have to do with practical politics? How would 
a society look if freedom of dissociation were given the respect it deserved? What would a 
dissociationist society look like in practice? The practical aspect of dissociationism, apart 
from my rather abstract recommendations concerning fair and equal access, and the like, are 
not my concern here. Indeed, as a philosopher I doubt I am equipped to say anything of great 
substance. That is why we have politicians. What I would insist is that a dissociationist 
society that was recognizably liberal can exist. By definition it would be secular and 
pluralistic, with a government and state apparatus that had to be professedly neutral in its 
dealings with different individuals and groups. There would, of course, be fierce competition 
for resources, but then that exists already with the various groups and organizations that 
constantly lobby, and even hijack, government in order to benefit from taxpayer funds. There 
seems to me no reason in principle why a system of revenue sharing and equitable 
distribution could not be implemented. A dissociationist state would, I presume, be highly 
federalised.  
Recall, I am not talking about balkanization or anything close. The issue is not one 
of borders and sovereignty, but of internal freedoms for individuals and groups. The degree 
of federalisation would depend on the extent of dissociation – not something anyone can 
predict. But there would have to be mechanisms for recognizing dissociation in various walks 
of life. Take the sort of example with which I started, namely health care. A single, 
monolithic, state-run service might not be inherently inconsistent with dissociationism, but 
the complexity of implementing it might mean that a fully or partly privatised service was the 
only practical solution. One could not rule out a fully state-run service broken into multiple 
subsidiaries that serviced different groups, with equitable sharing of resources, but again the 
cost and complexity might be prohibitive compared to the efficiencies of a private system of 
health care. Again, it would depend in large degree on the extent of dissociation: what do 
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people want? What would best service the requirements of the different individuals and 
groups in a given society? 
I leave it to experts to think about the ways in which freedom of dissociation could 
be implemented. I want to emphasize that, for all the distaste or aversion many might feel 
toward the dissociationist proposal, the key idea remains: either there is freedom of 
association or there is not. If there is, then there must be freedom of dissociation. Either 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are taken seriously or they are not. If there is 
no freedom of religion, or no freedom of conscience, or no freedom of dissociation as a 
broad, general right, then liberalism itself is a myth. To call oneself liberal while resiling 
from the rights and freedoms liberals should take seriously is to be a liberal in name only. 
Rather than focusing on our worst instincts and the many ways in which dissociationism can 
go wrong, perhaps liberals should do what they have always professed to do, which is show 
some faith in human nature and in the possibility for people to get along despite their 
differences if the social arrangements are right. If they are not right – if diversity combined 
with proximity lead to conflict – then maybe the best way out is to dissociate. 
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Notes 
 
1 http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2016/06/23/california-churches-forced-to-cover-
abortion-in-healthcare-plans/. (This and all web pages last accessed 14.4.17.) 
2 http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/437649/ontario-md-assoc-requires-all-docs-
complicity-euthananasia. 
3 http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2016/07/04/catholic-care-home-in-belgium-fined-for-
refusing-
euthanasia/?utm_content=bufferc489f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm
_campaign=buffer. 
4 Strickland (2012). 
5 https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/expressions-of-doctors-beliefs.  
6 https://www.thefire.org/cases/university-of-delaware-students-required-to-undergo-
ideological-reeducation/.  
7 http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2016/08/consensus-statement-on-conscientious-
objection-in-healthcare/.  
8 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9802067/Christian-wins-right-to-wear-cross-at-
work.html.  
9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/nice-becomes-latest-french-city-to-
impose-burkini-ban.  
10 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3464222/Gay-couple-feel-dehumanized-
Christian-baker-refuses-make-wedding-cake.html.  
11 Burwell (2013).  
12 RFRA (1993).  
13 See, for example, Indiana: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_Freedom_Restoration_Act_(Indiana).  
14 This is a simplification, of course. Very similar conflicts occur within religions, for 
example liberals against conservatives on women ministers in some Christian churches. But it 
would also be misleading to paint the battle lines as between liberals and conservatives, since 
one might be a relatively liberal religious believer and still object to some state impositions, 
such as compulsory sex education or the prohibition of certain religious displays. The best 
way of characterising the conflict is as one between religious freedom and freedom of 
conscience on one side and secular or at least secularising forces on the other. 
15 UDHR (1948): Article 20.  
16 ECHR (1950): Article 11, sec. 1. 
17 Article 20 of the UN Declaration is similar, albeit a bit less expansive with its exceptions. 
18 Isn’t it the other way around – that freedom of association presupposes, at least in part, the 
right to property? After all, right to choose whom to let onto my land or use my goods, and so 
on, depends upon my prior ownership. True, but this is not enough to show that property 
rights are prior to association rights. It is my right to associate with whom I choose, including 
with whom I choose to enter an exchange, that makes it possible for me to have property 
rights at all, since the latter entail freely chosen exchanges of ownership, use, and the like.  
19 Doogan (2014).  
20 http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-
protection/upload/Federal-Conscience-Laws.pdf.  
21 Such as a recent, gruesome case from Brazil: 
http://www.torontosun.com/2013/03/28/brazilian-doctor-charged-with-7-murders-linked-to-
300-deaths.  
22 Bull (2013).  
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23 Ibid: para. 36. At the time, the state did not recognise ‘gay marriage’, so Preddy and Hall 
were in a ‘civil partnership’ with many of the benefits of marriage. 
24 See http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_181922/lang--
en/index.htm and the links therein to the two conventions. 
25 Forced Labour (1930): Article 2, sec. 1. 
26 National Academies (2004): 141.  
27 Abolition (1957): Article 1, sections (a) and (e). 
28 Equality Act (2010); see, for explanation, EHRC (2014): 20. 
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